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“SPECIAL” DELIVERY: WHERE DO NATIONAL 
SECURITY LETTERS FIT INTO THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT? 
Lauren M. Weiner∗
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the summer of 2005, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) visited George Christian, a digital services manager for over three-
dozen Connecticut libraries1 and presented him with a “National Security 
Letter.”2  The letter directed Mr. Christian to turn over subscriber 
information and access logs of Internet users at a certain library.3  Over 
30,000 National Security Letters, or “NSLs,” are issued each year, 
presumably to investigate terrorists.4  But because NSLs require the 
recipient to keep the letter secret,5
Historically, if an investigation concerned “international terrorist 
activities” it was subject to little oversight.
 what do we really know about NSLs? 
6  Serious abuses of investigative 
power, however, led Congress to enact legislation designed to protect civil 
liberties, even for “foreign intelligence investigations.”7
 
      ∗ J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.S., Northwestern 
University, 2000.  I would like to thank Professor Dan Richman for his guidance, Genevive 
Blake for her careful edits and Nick Mitchell for thoughtfully reviewing countless drafts and 
helping me clarify my position on this issue. 
  After the terrorist 
 1. Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau 
Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1.  Under the 
newest changes to the USA PATRIOT Act, most libraries are now exempt from complying 
with NSLs.  See David Stout, Bush Signs Bill Renewing Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 
2006 (online edition, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/09/politics/09cnd-
patriot.html). 
 2. Gellman, supra note 1, at A1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2006). 
 6. Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A 
Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 37, 
39-40 (2005). 
 7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 
1841-46, 1861-62, 1871 (2006). 
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attacks of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act (“PATRIOT Act”)8 to aid law enforcement efforts to fight 
terrorism.9  The PATRIOT Act broadened the scope of certain 
investigatory tools, making the job of law enforcement easier and 
subjecting law enforcement agencies to fewer limitations.  One such tool, 
National Security Letters, gives the government the authority to request 
certain types of transactional records without requiring judicial pre-
approval and without giving the recipient a meaningful method to 
challenge it.10
In several of its sections, the PATRIOT Act combines the procedures for 
traditional criminal law enforcement with the looser procedural standards 
that are in place for foreign counterintelligence investigations.
  This begs the question: what does it mean to “fight 
terrorism?”  Is the goal to prevent further terrorist attacks or to prosecute 
the perpetrators?  That question has some important implications as the 
government struggles to sculpt a regulatory regime for terrorism cases that 
will be both effective and constitutional.  There are different rules and 
procedures for domestic criminal investigations than for investigations that 
focus on foreign intelligence gathering.  It is clear that a murder 
investigation is intended to gather evidence that will lead to the prosecution 
of the killer.  When it comes to counter-terrorism, however, it is not as easy 
to determine whether the investigation is for the purpose of deterrence or 
prosecution.  Furthermore, what safeguard is there to prevent a law 
enforcement officer, even one with good intentions, from using the less 
stringent standards for foreign intelligence operations to gather evidence 
that wouldn’t otherwise be accessible if he had to follow the stricter 
procedures for a domestic criminal investigation? 
11
 
 8. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49 and 50 
U.S.C. (2006)). 
  In some 
respects, NSLs are similar to administrative subpoenas—an information-
gathering tool for domestic criminal investigations.  In fact, the Bush 
Administration has suggested granting the FBI administrative subpoena 
power for counter-terrorism investigations so they would have the same 
tools available to catch terrorists as are already available to catch doctors 
 9. Neil A. Lewis & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: Congress; Negotiators Back 
Scaled-Down Bill to Battle Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at A1. 
 10. Woods, supra note 6, at 41.  NSLs were not created by the PATRIOT Act, but it 
expanded the government’s power to use them.  See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying 
text. 
 11. See infra notes 73-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of foreign intelligence 
investigations. 
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engaged in insurance fraud.12
So what are NSLs? Are they ordinary domestic law enforcement tools 
that have the looser standards of foreign intelligence-gathering tools? Or 
are they tools for foreign intelligence that may be used for ordinary 
domestic criminal investigations?  Are they constitutional?  And even if 
constitutional, are they still problematic? 
  This suggestion, however, over-simplifies 
the issue and disregards the fundamental differences between foreign 
intelligence investigations and criminal investigations—especially as 
related to the constitutionality of warrantless searches. 
This Comment will examine NSLs both in the context of foreign 
intelligence and domestic criminal investigations.  There are substantial 
arguments on both sides of the debate over the constitutionality of NSLs; 
this Comment will primarily be focused on how to classify NSLs and how 
to use them in a manner that reduces the potential for abuse or over-
reaching.  This Comment will argue that NSLs are not foreign intelligence 
tools, but are merely foreign intelligence exceptions to domestic laws that 
allow law enforcement access to records that would otherwise be protected 
by privacy laws.  Accordingly, NSLs must be able to satisfy the 
constitutional requirements for domestic searches.  First, this Comment will 
provide background on NSLs, the Fourth Amendment, and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.  Then, this Comment will examine NSLs in 
the context of the permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement for 
searches—specifically the “special needs” exception.  Finally, this 
Comment will argue that even if NSLs are constitutional despite their 
issuance without a warrant, they still have great potential for abuse and 
additional safeguards beyond the recent revisions are necessary. 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
In evaluating laws pertaining to criminal procedure, one must make a 
distinction between investigations focused on “foreign agents,” or general 
foreign intelligence, and ordinary domestic criminal investigations.13
 
 12. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in a Conversation on the 
U.S.A. Patriot Act (April 20, 2004), available at http://www.vote-
smart.org/speech_detail.php?speech_id=33849 (last visited February 25, 2006); see  also 
David E. Sanger, Two Years Later: The President; President Urging Wider U.S. Powers in 
Terrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at A1. 
  Law 
enforcement officials are authorized to use a more expansive set of tools to 
obtain records and information when the investigation pertains to foreign 
persons or intelligence activities.  This section will first examine the 
statutes authorizing NSLs, and will outline their powers and their 
 13. See infra notes 73-96 and accompanying text. 
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limitations. This section will also discuss the Fourth Amendment and its 
relationship to domestic and foreign investigations because, in some 
respects, NSLs are a hybrid of foreign and domestic investigatory 
standards. 
A.  National Security Letters 
Law enforcement officials are authorized to issue NSLs under three 
statutes: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”),14 
the Right to Financial Privacy Act,15 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.16  
These statutes were enacted to offer protection to individuals for records in 
the possession of third parties, an area not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment.17  NSLs were included as an exception to this protection by 
allowing access to these records for government agencies “authorized to 
conduct foreign counter- or foreign positive-intelligence activities.”18
This Note will primarily focus on the ECPA—the statute that has most 
frequently been evaluated in the context of national security.
 
19  The ECPA 
was designed to give statutory protection to stored electronic information 
held by a “wire or electronic communications service provider.”20
Section 2709, the national security provision of Title II of the ECPA, 
was designed to enable law enforcement to investigate suspected terrorists 
or foreign agents.
 
21
 
 14. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
  The original version of the ECPA section 2709 
allowed the FBI to compel production of (1) subscriber information 
(limited to name, address, and length of service); (2) local and long 
 15. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2004). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v (Supp. 2004).  Another statute, 50 U.S.C. § 436(b) 
(2006), authorizes the government to compel disclosure of certain records of current or 
former government employees who at one time had access to classified information. 
 17. Woods, supra note 6, at 46-49.  The Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. 
Miller permitted the government to access financial records from a bank without violating 
the Fourth Amendment.  See 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976). 
 18. Woods, supra note 6, at 43. 
 19. Much of the uproar over NSLs centered on their use to obtain library records.  For a 
detailed discussion see generally Susan Nevelow Mart, Protecting the Lady from Toledo: 
Post-USA PATRIOT Act Electronic Surveillance at the Library, 96 L. LIBR. J. 449 (2004).  
Librarians and others raised concerns that library patrons may believe that the FBI is 
looking into the books they read and the websites they visit on library computers.  Id. at 468. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2709).  Title I of the statute defines an electronic communications service (“ECS”) 
as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2002). 
 21. Title II is also referred to as the “Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and 
Transactional Records Act.”  See Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201. 
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distance toll billing records; and (3) electronic communication transactional 
records.22
The standard for obtaining this information under the original version of 
the ECPA was that the information sought had to be “relevant to an 
authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation,” and there had to be 
“specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or 
entity to whom the information sought pertain[ed] [was] a foreign power or 
agent of a foreign power.”
 
23  There are other provisions of Title II of the 
ECPA that allow law enforcement to obtain similar types of information in 
the context of a “criminal investigation,” but, unlike NSLs, those 
provisions require judicial pre-approval.24  The fact that the ECPA provides 
access to records in domestic criminal investigations may be a significant 
factor in evaluating whether NSLs under section 2709 serve a purpose 
beyond the need for ordinary law enforcement.25
Further, while domestic criminal investigations require the approval of a 
judge, NSLs for national security investigations are authorized by the 
agency that issues them.
 
26 Before passage of the PATRIOT Act, an NSL 
required only the approval of an FBI official with a rank “not lower than 
Deputy Assistant Director.”27  The issues of self-authorization and rank of 
law enforcement officials authorized to approve NSLs will be revisited in 
later sections of this Note, as part of a discussion of the potential for 
overreaching on the part of the law enforcement agencies.28
Section 2709 remained relatively unchanged
 
29
 
 22. Memorandum from General Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Investigation to All Field 
Offices 2 (Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter FBI NSL Memo]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-46, at 6 
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1913, 1917.  “Transactional records” generally refer 
to records of the communication that do not reveal their content.  For example, a 
transactional record would reveal the phone numbers dialed from a particular phone, but 
would not reveal the substance of the calls.  See FBI NSL Memo, supra, at 4-5. 
 until the USA PATRIOT 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (1996). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (requiring a warrant); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) 
(requiring a subpoena); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring a court order). 
 25. See infra notes 125-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “special 
needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
 26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709(b)(1)-(2). 
 27. Id.  Other sections of Title II require the FBI to obtain a warrant or a subpoena, but 
these sections pertain to “criminal investigation[s],” not foreign intelligence.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2703 (a), (b)(1)(B)(i), (d).  See also infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text for a 
further discussion of domestic criminal investigations. 
 28. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 29. In 1993, following the first World Trade Center bombings, the “foreign power” 
requirement was loosened to allow investigation of an individual who communicated with a 
foreign power regarding terrorism or foreign intelligence.  18 U.S.C. § 2709 (1994); H.R. 
REP. NO. 103-46, at 3 (1993). 
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Act enlarged NSL power specifically, and foreign intelligence-gathering 
power more generally.  Passed seven weeks after 9/11, the draft bill of the 
USA PATRIOT Act30 called for, in pertinent part, expansion of the 
government’s information-gathering powers by eliminating or reducing 
judicial oversight.31  A period of intense negotiations between the 
legislative and executive branches followed.32  The proposal by Senator 
Patrick Leahy would have allowed increased intelligence powers, but 
would have included significantly more judicial supervision than the 
administration’s plan.33  The Bush administration made it clear that its 
priority was to get new anti-terrorism legislation through Congress as 
quickly as possible.34  While congressional democrats, like Senator Leahy, 
indicated that Congress would not be pushed to act in haste and that they 
would continue to work to balance law enforcement needs with 
constitutional rights,35 many of the negotiations were done behind closed 
doors in private meetings.  Senator Russ Feingold stated “there has not 
been an open process in the Judiciary Committee, much less the full 
Senate, for Senators to have an opportunity to raise concerns about how far 
this bill goes in giving power to law enforcement to . . . investigate law-
abiding U.S. citizens.”36  Regardless of such concerns, the PATRIOT Act 
was passed and on October 26, 2001, it was signed into law.37
The PATRIOT Act changed NSLs by expanding the FBI’s power to use 
them and by codifying and correcting disparities in pre-existing law 
 
 
 30. See generally Consultation and Discussion Draft Bill to Combat Terrorism and 
Defend the Nation Against Terrorist Acts, and for Other Purposes, with the short title, 
“Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001” (administration draft bill, Sept. 19, 2001), available at 
www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ata2001_text.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); see also 
Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: the Making of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1145, 1153 n.43 (2004). The administration’s draft bill was renamed because the 
initials “ATA” were too close to the name of one of the 9/11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta.  
Howell, supra, at 1153 n.43. 
 31. Howell, supra note 30, at 1146-54. 
 32. Id. at 1154. 
 33. See generally Draft, Uniting and Strengthening America Act (Senator Leahy’s draft 
bill), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200109/AYO01_714.pdf (last visited Oct. 
20, 2006).  Leahy’s plan, for example, allowed the information from a grand jury 
investigation to be shared, but required court authorization and a certification that the 
matters were relevant to a terrorism investigation.  Id. at 130-31. 
 34. See Howell, supra note 30, at 1160-62 (discussing the administration’s comments 
regarding the passage of the legislation). 
 35. See 147 CONG. REC. S10, 547 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001). 
 36. 147 CONG. REC. S10, 36301 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2001). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  While certain provisions of the 
PATRIOT Act were originally scheduled to “sunset” on December 31, 2005, negotiations 
continued past the deadline and the reauthorization of the Act was signed into law on March 
9, 2006.  See Stout, supra note 1. 
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relating to Internet and telephone records gathering.38  NSLs were 
broadened by (1) expanding the scope of applicable investigations from 
“authorized foreign counterintelligence operation[s]” to “authorized 
investigation[s] to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities”; (2) compelling production where the information 
sought is merely “relevant” to the investigation; (3) substituting relevance 
for “specific and articulable facts”; and (4) lowering the rank of the FBI 
official who can authorize an NSL from “Deputy Assistant Director,” to 
“Special Agent in Charge” of a field office.39
B. The Fourth Amendment 
 
Much of the debate surrounding law enforcement power involves the 
Fourth Amendment and whether or not certain law enforcement tools are 
violative of the rights it guarantees.  The Fourth Amendment provides that 
the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.40
In order for the Fourth Amendment to effectively regulate the investigatory 
process, it needs to have a “meaningful enforcement mechanism” and must 
be broadly applicable.
 
41
The Fourth Amendment will protect individuals from the abuse of law 
enforcement power if the contested activity is classifiable as a “search” or a 
“seizure.”
 
42
 
 38. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209, 115 Stat. at 283 (correcting the disparate 
requirements to allow access to stored e-mail and voicemail). 
 The Supreme Court has held that a seizure is a “meaningful 
 39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006). There are only a limited number of Deputy Assistant 
Directors, located at FBI headquarters and in the New York and Los Angeles field offices.  
There are fifty-six FBI field offices in the United States and each of those, with the 
exception of the New York and Los Angeles offices, have one Special Agent in Charge 
(“SAC”).  The New York and Los Angeles offices have SACs for special projects or 
divisions.  The head of the New York and Los Angeles field offices are Assistant Directors.  
See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Your Local FBI Office Field Divisions, 
http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 41. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided 
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2005).  Applicability refers 
to the specific law enforcement activities that are covered by the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
 42. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 2.1 (4th ed. 2004) (citing Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974)) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]; see also 
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interference with an individual’s possessory interests” in property.43  The 
definition of a search is less clear and has been frequently reevaluated.44  
Taken as a whole, it seems that searches are physical intrusions into “a 
constitutionally protected area.”45  If the intrusion is classified as either a 
search or seizure, it must be “reasonable.”46
One way for law enforcement to conduct a “reasonable” search is to 
obtain a warrant.
 
47  The Supreme Court has expressed its preference for 
searches made with judicial pre-approval, rather than having search and 
seizure decisions made on the scene by police officers.48  In order for a 
warrant to be granted, there must be a showing of “probable cause.”49  
Probable cause requires law enforcement officers to have sufficient 
evidence to convince a neutral magistrate that the search is likely to reveal 
criminal activity.50  Search warrants may not be used in cases of mere 
suspicion, because they require a showing of facts to support probable 
cause.51
A search where the law enforcement officer has first obtained a warrant 
is presumptively reasonable, but there are circumstances in which the 
Fourth Amendment permits searches without one.
 
52
 
Solove, supra note 
  Generally speaking, 
an activity covered by the Fourth Amendment (i.e. a search or seizure) 
must be reasonable; if it is not covered then there are no limitations on law 
41, at 750. 
 43. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 42, § 2.1(a) (citations omitted). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)). 
 46. See Solove, supra note 41, at 750. 
 47. For a detailed discussion of the history of the warrant clause see Harold J. Krent, 
The Continuity Principle, Administrative Constraint, and the Fourth Amendment, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 53, 57-61 (2005). 
 48. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 42, § 4.1 (citations omitted).  See infra 
note 152 for a discussion of potential abuse of power when decisions are in the hands of 
low-level officers. 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The probable cause requirement was included in the Fourth 
Amendment to protect individuals from indiscriminate government searches and seizures. 
See generally Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth 
Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 786 (2004).  The Framers of the Constitution included 
the probable cause requirement as part of the Bill of Rights in reaction to the arbitrary 
abuses of police power suffered under British rule, especially warrants that did not 
specifically name an individual suspect.  Id. at 790. 
 50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring law enforcement officers requesting a search 
warrant to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized”). 
 52. Solove, supra note 41, at 751-53 (discussing the retreat of Fourth Amendment 
protections).  For a discussion of warrantless searches see infra notes 71-72 and 
accompanying text. 
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enforcement’s power under the Fourth Amendment.53
While much Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment relies upon Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Katz v. United States,
 
54 there has been much debate and 
dissension over the definition of “privacy.”55  According to Justice Harlan, 
the Fourth Amendment is applicable if the individual has an “actual” 
(subjective) expectation of privacy, and that expectation is “one that society 
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”56  Prior to the Court’s holding in 
Katz, an intrusion into an individual’s privacy required an actual physical 
invasion of an individual’s home or person.57  While the holding in Katz 
effectively rejected this conception of privacy,58 there are other views of 
privacy that are equally, if not more, limiting to the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  Professor Daniel Solove refers to one such 
conception as the “secrecy paradigm”—that the only invasion of privacy 
occurs when a “deep secret is uncovered.”59  According to this view, 
records, such as the transactional records accessible by issuing an NSL, 
would not be considered “secret” enough to be private and thus would not 
be covered by the Fourth Amendment.60
An additional limitation on the Fourth Amendment’s applicability 
pertaining to NSLs is the “third party doctrine.”  The third party doctrine 
provides that information placed in the hands of, or that is known to, a third 
party, no longer falls under a reasonable expectation of privacy.
 
61  
Examples include bank records62 and records of the phone numbers that a 
person dials.63
 
 53. Solove, supra note 
  The third party doctrine conceivably applies to the records 
accessible by an NSL; subscriber information and toll records are in the 
41, at 750. 
      54. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 55. Solove, supra note 41, at 751. 
 56. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). 
 57. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that an 
individual was not protected from government wiretapping because the government did not 
physically enter his home). 
 58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (holding that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not 
places”). 
 59. See Solove, supra note 41, at 751 (citing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: 
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42 (2004)). 
 60. Id. at 752-53. 
 61. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him 
to Government authorities.”). 
 62. Id. at 441-43. 
 63. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  In Smith, the Court held that because 
people are aware that the numbers they dial go to the phone company, they do not “harbor 
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.” Id. at 743. 
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possession of the phone company or Internet service provider (“ISP”). 
While the primary remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is 
the exclusionary rule,64 searches made pursuant to a warrant may be 
challenged only after they are executed.65  It may be difficult to suppress 
evidence gathered from a search executed pursuant to a warrant, however, 
as the courts tend to find that the search warrant was presumptively valid if 
signed by a neutral magistrate.66
In the context of NSLs, it is important to note that third parties, such as a 
telephone company, lack standing to challenge the validity of a search, 
even if it affects the third party’s privacy interests.
 
67  A third party has its 
own Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure; it cannot be required to turn over records absent consent or a 
Fourth Amendment sanctioned procedure.68  For example, a subscriber to 
an Internet service would not be able to challenge a search of the records of 
the ISP; the provider would be the only party with the ability to challenge 
that search.  Further, using search warrants as a means of obtaining 
information from a third party may be unnecessarily intrusive where the 
third party is willing to surrender the documents without compelling their 
production.69
Despite the preference for searches pursuant to a warrant from a 
constitutional perspective, there are arguments to be made against a warrant 
requirement.  The process of obtaining a warrant requires a considerable 
expenditure of time—on the part of the judges who must examine the facts 
and the officers who must demonstrate the existence of probable cause with 
a showing of particular facts.
 
70
 
 64. The exclusionary rule allows the suppression of evidence obtained through a search 
that infringes upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.  See United States v. Caladra, 
414 U.S. 338 (1974); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
 65. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 42, § 4.1(f). 
 66. Id. § 11.2(b). 
 67. Id. § 11.3(d) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 passim (1976) (holding 
bank customer could not challenge seizure of records from the bank)). 
 68. E.g., Seattle Times News Servs., Phone Records: Telecoms May Be in Trouble, 
SEATTLE TIMES, May 13, 2006, at A1. 
 69. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging 
Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 575 (1994).  
Search warrants offer Fourth Amendment protections that may not be necessary when 
dealing with third parties, such as telephone carriers, who might be willing to turn over the 
requested information on demand.  See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 
(1976). Department of Justice policy advises that warrants should not be used in an 
investigation if the information sought can be obtained through less intrusive means.  28 
C.F.R. § 59.1 (2005); see also FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22, at 3. 
 70. See Krent, supra note 47, at 62 (“The Framers’ decision to require ex ante review in 
each case reflects their commitment not to relegate protection for privacy to after-the-fact 
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enumerated two tests applied by courts to determine when a warrantless 
search will overcome the presumption of unreasonableness.  The “special-
needs” exception allows warrantless searches where the primary purpose in 
administering the search goes beyond the ordinary need for law 
enforcement and the state’s interest in that purpose outweighs the 
individual’s privacy interest.71  The other test, called the “reasonableness 
balancing test,” permits warrantless searches where the totality of the 
state’s legitimate interests outweigh the privacy interests of the individual 
to be searched.72
1. Foreign Intelligence Investigations 
  Both tests are potentially applicable to NSLs, which, after 
all, are searches performed without judicial review. 
This section, along with a discussion of information-gathering for 
domestic investigations,73 will provide context in which to determine 
whether NSLs fall within the realm of foreign intelligence—and 
accordingly should be placed under the auspices of the specialized court 
that handles foreign intelligence matters—or if they are actually tools for 
ordinary domestic law enforcement.  Although discussion of foreign 
intelligence law centers on the regulations for surveillance and wiretaps, it 
is applicable to NSLs both because foreign intelligence law now includes 
access to “tangible objects,” and because the standards set forth under 
foreign intelligence law are similar to those in section 2709 of the ECPA.74
Intelligence-gathering for domestic criminal investigations clearly falls 
under the auspices of the Fourth Amendment.
 
75  Nevertheless, the question 
of how to regulate national security intelligence remained open for many 
years.  In 1972, the Supreme Court, in United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
commonly known as the “Keith” case, found that the restrictions placed on 
wiretaps for domestic investigations did not limit “the constitutional power 
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the 
United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other 
unlawful means.”76
 
mechanisms . . . .”). 
  The Court further held that “security surveillance may 
 71. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 72. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); see also Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 73. See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text. 
 74. See supra note 26. 
 75. See Solove, supra note 41, at 754-56.  Wiretapping is covered by the Fourth 
Amendment, but is regulated through the Wiretap Act.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520 (2000). 
 76. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 307-08 (1972). 
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involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance 
of ordinary crime.”77  The Court declined, however, to rule on the 
executive’s power to use surveillance “with respect to the activities of 
foreign powers, within or without this country.”78  The decision in Keith 
indicated that the Supreme Court accepted the possibility that “[d]ifferent 
standards,” other than a traditional warrant, “may be compatible with the 
Fourth Amendment if [it is] reasonable both in relation to the legitimate 
need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of 
our citizens.”79
Six years after the decision in Keith, Congress addressed the questions 
left unanswered by its holding.
 
80  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (“FISA”) of 197881 was enacted by Congress to create a regulatory 
regime outside of the traditional regime for criminal law, which would act 
as a check on the executive’s power to conduct investigations of “foreign 
agents” in the United States.82  Under FISA, the government must apply for 
orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) in order 
to conduct intelligence-gathering activities.83  The FISC is designed to hear 
requests for court orders that pertain to foreign intelligence.84
Pre-PATRIOT Act, FISA orders were primarily used for electronic 
surveillance of foreign agents.
 
85
 
 77. Id. at 322 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
  Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act 
 78. Id. at 307-08.  The Keith Court also addressed the question of the Fourth 
Amendment implications of national security surveillance without the prior approval of a 
neutral magistrate, as would be required to obtain a Title III wiretap order.  See Peter P. 
Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 
1315 (2004) (citing Keith, 407 U.S. at 309 (citations omitted)). 
 79. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322. 
 80. See Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall 
Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 321 
(2005); Solove, supra note 41, at 756. 
 81. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-
29, 1841-46, 1861-62, 1871). 
 82. Swire, supra note 78, at 1313. 
 83. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006).  For surveillance activities involving communications 
“exclusively between or among foreign powers” with “no substantial likelihood that the 
surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person 
is a party,” the government may conduct the surveillance without a court order.  See 50 
U.S.C. § 1802 (a)(1). 
 84. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803.  The FISC currently consists of eleven district court judges 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Id.  Originally, the FISC had seven 
judges, but the PATRIOT Act added additional judges. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, § 208(i), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001). 
 85. Following the bombings in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center, Congress 
authorized FISA orders for travel records.  See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (2006) (allowing 
access to records held by common carriers (airlines, trains, etc.), physical storage facilities 
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amended FISA, however, by allowing its use to compel production of 
business records and other “tangible objects.”86  The scope of materials 
covered by section 215 now includes books, records, papers, documents, 
and “other items,” provided that the government can make the requisite 
showing to the FISC.87
Prior to the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the showing required for a 
FISA order was probable cause that the target of the request was a “foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power” and that the “purpose” of the 
investigation was to gather foreign intelligence.
 
88  Now, FISA’s scope has 
been expanded to include investigations where foreign intelligence 
gathering is a “significant purpose.”89  The PATRIOT Act also lowered the 
burden of proof for the government to obtain an order for business records 
or for other “tangible things.”90  Previously, a FISA order required a 
showing of “specific and articulable facts” giving “reason to believe that 
the person to whom the records pertain[ed] [was] a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power.”91  Now, when applying for a FISA order, the 
application need only “specify that the records concerned are sought for an 
authorized investigation.”92  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has the 
discretion to define the term “authorized investigation.”93  Moreover, FISA 
orders now can be used to investigate virtually anyone, as there is no 
requirement that the request include a specific target.94  The investigation 
must simply “protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities” —a broad standard that could include many types of 
investigations.95  The implications of this change are potentially 
enormous—it allows the government to use a FISA order to gather 
information for an ordinary domestic prosecution if one of the purposes of 
the investigation relates to foreign intelligence.96
 
(rental lockers, etc.), public accommodation facilities (hotels, etc.), and vehicle rental 
facilities). 
 
 86. See Swire, supra note 78, at 1331. 
 87. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(2) (West 2003). 
 88. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 89. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 204 (emphasis added); see 
also Solove, supra note 41, at 757. 
 90. USA PATRIOT Act  § 215. 
 91. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (1998).  Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 92. 50 U.S.C.A § 1861(b)(2) (West 2006). 
 93. Swire, supra note 78, at 1331; see also FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22, at 2-3. 
 94. See Swire, supra note 78, at 1331. 
 95. 50 U.S.C.A. §1861(b)(2) (West 2006). 
 96. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 41, at 757. 
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2. Domestic Law Enforcement 
In a previous section, this Note established that NSLs were originally 
intended as foreign intelligence exceptions to statutes that protect 
privacy.97  Given that NSLs are not subject to restraints placed on other 
foreign intelligence investigations through FISA,98
 a. Administrative Subpoenas 
 e.g., pre-approval by 
the FISC, arguably, NSLs should then be subjected to either the 
constitutional or statutory protections required for domestic criminal 
investigations.  This next section will briefly examine two types of 
information-gathering techniques for criminal investigations: 
administrative subpoenas and grand jury subpoenas.  These tools do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, despite procedures that differ from ordinary 
search warrants.  Accordingly, they may serve as a valuable comparison 
when deciding whether NSLs are constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Administrative subpoenas are issued by federal agencies pursuant to a 
delegation of power from Congress.99  An administrative subpoena can 
compel documents and testimony.100  Administrative subpoenas also 
enable investigators to bypass the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause 
requirement in criminal investigations.101
 
 97. See supra Part I.A and accompanying text. 
  An administrative subpoena 
 98. See supra Part I.A and accompanying text. 
 99. See Katherine Scherb, Comment, Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial 
Records: What Protection for Privacy Does the Fourth Amendment Afford?, 1996 WIS. L. 
REV. 1075, 1076-85 (providing a history of the development of administrative subpoena 
power).  Examples of agencies that issue administrative subpoenas include the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78u(b) (2002) (investigating violations of securities law); 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) 
(1998) (investigating tax code violations); see also Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2000).  The Attorney General was 
granted the power to conduct criminal investigations into healthcare fraud using a civil 
administrative subpoena.  18 U.S.C. § 3486. 
 100. See Risa Berkower, Note, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of 
Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251, 2257 
(2005). 
 101. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (holding that 
compliance with an administrative subpoena did not present a question of an actual search 
or seizure and, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment was not directly applicable); see also 
Berkower, supra note 100, at 2253 (citing Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 
2001) (holding that no probable cause is required to issue an administrative subpoena under 
18 U.S.C. § 3486)).  Courts treat civil and criminal matters differently for Fourth 
Amendment purposes; the Constitution is far more protective of a criminal defendant’s 
rights.  See Berkower, supra note 100 at 2261 (citing Ronald F. Wright, Note, The Civil and 
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initiates an open proceeding with plenty of opportunity for a party opposing 
the requested materials to challenge the subpoena in court.  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that administrative subpoenas are not 
actual searches and as such, need not require a showing of probable 
cause.102  Generally, administrative subpoenas will be enforced by the 
courts so long as: (1) the investigation has a legitimate purpose; (2) the 
inquiry is related to that purpose; (3) the agency does not already have the 
information sought; and (4) the agency follows proper procedures.103  
Administrative subpoenas “commence[] an adversar[ial] process” that 
permits judicial review of its reasonableness.104
b. Grand Jury Subpoenas 
 
The federal grand jury is an investigative body given broad power to 
compel testimony and production of documents.105  An investigative grand 
jury has the authority, absent a showing of valid privilege, to subpoena any 
books, papers, documents, data, or other objects,106 and to compel witness 
testimony.107  A grand jury subpoena may be issued without a showing of 
probable cause,108 and the grand jury “can investigate merely on suspicion 
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it 
is not.”109
One limitation on the grand jury subpoena power is Rule 17(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that, “on motion 
made promptly, the court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance 
would be unreasonable or oppressive.”
 
110  It is, however, exceedingly 
difficult to quash a subpoena once it is issued.111
 
Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1127 (1984)). 
  The moving party must 
 102. See, e.g., Okla. Press Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209. 
 103. See Doe v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing United 
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964)). 
 104. See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (“As judicial process 
is afforded before any intrusion occurs, the proposed intrusion is regulated by, and its 
justification derives from, that process.”). 
 105. See Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal 
Grand Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA PATRIOT Act’s Changes to 
Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699, 700 (2002). 
 106. See id. at 701. 
 107. See id.  A witness may refuse to speak to an investigator, but is not equally free to 
refuse to testify before the grand jury.  Id. 
 108. Id. at 701-02. 
 109. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). 
 110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); see also United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298-
99 (1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 111. See generally R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292. 
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show that the subpoena is “unreasonable or oppressive,” and that the 
motion will fail if there is a “reasonable possibility that the category of 
materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the 
general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”112
An individual subpoenaed by a grand jury cannot directly challenge the 
subpoena; the individual must refuse to comply and, if the government 
initiates a contempt proceeding, can then assert that the subpoena is 
unreasonably burdensome.
 
113  A target114 of a grand jury investigation can 
assert that the subpoenaed documents (or testimony) falls under a valid 
constitutional,115 statutory,116 or common law117 privilege, even if those 
documents are in the possession of a third party.118
PART II. NSLS AND DOMESTIC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
Thus far, this Note has discussed the statutory framework of NSLs and 
then examined foreign intelligence and domestic criminal investigatory 
regimes in order to classify NSLs as belonging to one or the other.  Prior to 
the passage of the PATRIOT Act and the loosening of the standards for 
issuing an NSL, it was easier to categorize NSLs as foreign intelligence 
tools. And as foreign intelligence tools, NSLs are not required to meet the 
standards for criminal investigations.119
 
 112. Id. at 299-301 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974)). 
  Now that NSLs can be used for 
investigations that have purposes besides foreign intelligence, perhaps 
NSLs should be required to satisfy the requirements for domestic criminal 
investigations. Because information regarding NSL use is classified, it is 
difficult to know if they are in fact being used to investigate.  The potential 
for abuse alone, however, lends weight to the argument that NSLs must fit 
within a Fourth Amendment sanctioned regulatory regime for domestic 
criminal investigations. 
 113. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971) (“If  . . . the subpoena is unduly 
burdensome or otherwise unlawful, [the recipient] may refuse to comply and litigate those 
questions in the event that contempt or similar proceedings are brought against him.”). 
 114. Generally, there are three categories of individuals called before a grand jury: 
targets, subjects, and witnesses.  See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, 
CRIMINAL DIVISION § 9-11.151 (2006). 
 115. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V. 
 116. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000) (declaring that illegally obtained wiretap 
evidence cannot be introduced to the grand jury). 
 117. One example of a common law privilege is that between attorneys and clients.  See, 
e.g., Maine v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 118. See Thirty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure II. Preliminary 
Proceedings, Grand Jury, 91 GEO. L.J. 210, 220-21 (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 
U.S. 7, 12-13 (1918)). 
 119. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006) (stating requirements for issue of an NSL). 
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To effectively evaluate NSLs in the context of domestic criminal 
investigations, several things must first be established.  First, does issuing 
an NSL constitute a search?  If not, the use of NSLs need only be 
reasonable to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.120  The FBI asserts that NSLs 
are not “searches” because they are only requests for information and 
recipients are not compelled to comply as NSLs are not backed with the 
contempt authority of the court.121
Second, NSLs are issued without a warrant or any type of judicial order, 
such as a FISA order; they are issued upon the certification from the FBI 
that the information requested is “relevant to an international terrorism or 
espionage investigation.”
  While technically speaking the FBI’s 
view is true, the average NSL recipient may nonetheless believe that a 
“search” is taking place. 
122  Therefore, they must fit within an exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement if they are to fit within the 
domestic criminal regulatory regime.  As a comparison, administrative 
subpoenas are “at best, constructive searches,” and as such they need not be 
supported by probable cause and need only be “reasonable.”123  But there 
are significant procedural differences between administrative subpoenas 
and NSLs, most importantly differences in judicial review, which may 
result in administrative subpoenas being reasonable while NSLs are not.124
The next sections will examine the “special-needs” exception and a more 
general, totality of the circumstances reasonableness test. 
 
A. Special-Needs Exception and NSLs 
NSLs, aside from being issued without judicial review, are issued 
without a showing that the target of the search is a terrorist or a terrorist 
supporter—the FBI merely “certifies” that the information requested is 
relevant to a counter-terrorism investigation.125
 
 120. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding grand jury 
subpoena to not be a “search”). 
 While ordinarily a search 
must be based on an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, when the risk 
to the public safety is substantial and real, a suspicionless search may still 
be “reasonable” and not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if one of the 
 121. Op-Ed., Rachel Brand & John Pistole, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The Use and 
Purpose of National Security Letters,  available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/natsecurityletters.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter 
FBI Use and Purpose Memo]. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United 
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950). 
 124. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 125. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006). 
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goals is criminal prosecution.126  The Supreme Court has long held that 
“the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of 
[individualized] suspicion”127 and “in certain limited circumstances, the 
Government’s need . . . is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on 
privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of 
individualized suspicion.”128
The doctrine of special needs addresses situations where circumstances 
beyond an ordinary need for law enforcement make the warrant/probable 
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment impracticable.
  Accordingly, an NSL unsupported by 
individualized suspicion may be consistent with the Fourth Amendment if 
it fits within the confines of the special-needs doctrine. 
129
To apply the exception, the court first determines if a special need exists, 
and then determines whether the state’s interest in that special need 
outweighs the privacy interest of the individual searched.
  The 
special-needs exception seems especially applicable in an analysis of NSLs 
because they too blur the line between law enforcement and another 
legitimate governmental purpose—national security. 
130  Some 
examples of circumstances where a special-needs exception was applied 
include the search of probationers’ homes when probation officers have 
“reasonable grounds” to believe that contraband is present,131 as well as the 
drug testing of high school athletes,132 DEA employees in sensitive 
positions,133 and locomotive engineers involved in a railway accident.134
 
 126. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 305-06 (1997). 
  
Two recent Supreme Court cases, however, demonstrate that warrantless 
searches will fall outside the special-needs exception to the Fourth 
Amendment when they serve the primary purpose of general crime 
 127. Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Co. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
829 (2002) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). 
 128. Id. (citing Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 
(1989)); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 129. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 130. Id. at 873-76. 
 131. Id. at 870-71. 
 132. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (permitting drug 
testing of high school student athletes to protect their health). 
 133. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989) 
(upholding mandatory drug testing for DEA agents employed in specific sensitive 
positions). 
 134. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (permitting 
mandatory drug testing of locomotive engineers following a railway accident).  But see 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (finding that purported special need for drug 
testing candidates for public office in Georgia did not fall into category of permissible 
suspicionless searches, in light of  the candidates’ privacy interests). 
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control.135  In Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court invalidated a highway 
checkpoint program on the grounds that the primary purpose was general 
crime control, despite the secondary purposes of driver safety and disaster 
prevention.136  The following year, in Ferguson v. Charleston, the Court 
further held that a government program with the primary purpose of crime 
control did not outweigh the privacy interests of pregnant mothers unless 
the drug testing was done with their consent.137
The most recent Supreme Court case to address the question of special 
needs, Illinois v. Lidster, expanded the scope of permissible warrantless 
searches by allowing them where the primary purpose of the law is 
“information-seeking.”
 
138  The Court recognized that despite the holding in 
Edmond, there are instances in which a purpose other than the need for law 
enforcement can relate to law enforcement activity, yet still justify a search 
without individualized suspicion.139
For NSLs to fulfill the requirements of the special-needs exception, they 
would have to serve a primary purpose other than the need for ordinary law 
enforcement.  Evidence of a special purpose may be found in the ECPA 
itself; the ECPA includes a provision allowing law enforcement to obtain 
electronic records in domestic criminal investigations.
 
140
Regardless of whether or not NSLs have a primary purpose beyond the 
need for ordinary law enforcement, they are reasonable under the totality of 
the circumstances.  Notwithstanding the special-needs exception, 
warrantless searches can still be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court has held that special-needs cases are actually “limited 
exception[s]” to the traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the 
circumstances reasonableness analysis.
  Therefore, 
because NSLs address access to the same records as section 2703, but for a 
different purpose, it seems that they serve a purpose outside of ordinary law 
enforcement. 
141
 
 135. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (holding that drug 
testing of obstetrics patients for the purpose of crime control was unreasonable); 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding highway checkpoints for the 
purpose of drug interdiction do not serve a special need). 
  Further, “there is no basis for 
examining official purpose” under the totality of the circumstances test, as 
 136. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43, 47-48. 
 137. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-86. 
 138. 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006) (allowing a government entity to require an electronic 
service provider to turn over stored electronic records if the government obtains a warrant 
from a criminal court). 
 141. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001). 
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would be required by the special needs test.142  Even if the primary purpose 
of the search is general law enforcement, the warrantless search is still 
permissible under the totality of the circumstances so long as the 
government’s legitimate interests outweigh the privacy interest of the 
individual.143
Totality of the Circumstances 
 
To analyze NSLs under a general reasonableness balancing test, it would 
certainly be helpful to have access to information regarding the use and 
effectiveness of NSLs in counter-terrorism operations.  Michael J. Woods, 
former chief of the FBI’s National Security Law Unit, makes the argument 
that the types of transactional records that can be gathered using NSLs are 
an “extraordinarily valuable source of data for counterintelligence analysts” 
because it is far more difficult for terrorists to cover up their “transactional 
footsteps” than it is for them to cover the substance of their 
communications.144  Furthermore, it has been argued that NSLs help 
expedite the process of following up on terrorist threats and tips in a timely 
manner.145  Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New York, 
despite opposing unchecked NSL power, nonetheless agrees that efficiency 
in national security investigations is valuable.146  National security is 
clearly “a paramount value, unquestionably one of the highest purposes for 
which any sovereign government is ordained.”147
On the other side of the balancing test, one must consider the 
individual’s privacy interests. As explored earlier in the discussion of the 
third party doctrine,
 
148 there is arguably a diminished privacy interest in 
information voluntarily turned over to a third party.149
 
 142. Id. (upholding a warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment because the 
government’s reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing outweighed a probationer’s diminished 
expectation of privacy). 
  If the risk of abuse 
of NSL power is great enough, however, it can potentially shift the balance 
towards finding NSLs unreasonable under a totality of the circumstances 
balancing test. 
 143. Id. at 119. 
 144. Woods, supra note 6, at 41-42. 
 145. FBI Use and Purpose Memo, supra note 121. 
 146. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“To perform its 
national security functions properly, government must be empowered to respond promptly 
and effectively to public exigencies as they arise . . . .”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
 149. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976). 
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1. Potential for Abuse 
Several factors may increase the potential for abuse of NSLs.  These are: 
(1) their secretive nature;150 (2) the lack of oversight;151 and (3) the fact 
that important decisions are placed in the hands of low-level officers.152
The Framers of the Constitution relied upon separation of powers and a 
system of checks and balances to protect individual citizens from potential 
abuse of civil liberties.
  
Arguably, the most compelling factor indicating a potential for abuse of 
NSL power is the blurring of the line between foreign intelligence 
investigations and ordinary domestic criminal investigations. 
153  There is a long history of such abuse in the 
realm of domestic intelligence investigations.154  For example, the FBI, 
CIA, Army, and other agencies have carried out investigations that far 
exceeded their intended scope.155  Perhaps the most famous example is the 
FBI’s domestic counter-intelligence program (“COINTELPRO”), which 
was “designed to ‘disrupt’ groups and ‘neutralize’ individuals deemed 
threats to national security.”156  Under COINTELPRO, the government 
targeted political opponents in order to discredit them in the eyes of the 
public,157 used the IRS to initiate tax investigations against political 
opponents,158
 
 150. The First Amendment impact of secrecy is outside the scope of this Note. 
 targeted “speakers, teachers, writers, and publications” in 
 151. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Krent, supra note 47, at 95.  Generally, the changes to NSLs under the 
PATRIOT Act do exactly what Framer James Otis warned of—they place too much power 
and discretion in the hands of low-level law enforcement officers.  Otis argued that low-
level officers were more likely to abuse their power either due to a lack of judgment or for 
personal motivations.  Id. 
 153. Id. at 94 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 333 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 
2005) (having two separate houses of Congress “doubles the security to the people by 
requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (stating that the 
requirement that the President approve new laws provides “an additional security against the 
enaction of improper laws”)). 
 154. See Swire, supra note 78, at 1316; see also SELECT COMM. TO STUDY 
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., 
FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, Book II, § I 
(1976) [hereinafter CHURCH REPORT IIA], available at 
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIa.htm. 
 155. CHURCH REPORT IIA, supra note 154 , § 1 (“The tendency of intelligence activities to 
expand beyond their initial scope is a theme which runs through every aspect of our 
investigative findings.  Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing 
demands for new data.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. MARTIN HALPERIN ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCIES 191-94 (1976). 
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attempt to chill political opponents’ First Amendment speech rights,159 and 
generally infringed the “values of privacy and freedom which our 
Constitution seeks to protect.”160
With NSLs, the potential for abuse also arises from the fact that the 
information obtained under foreign intelligence standards can be misused.  
If an investigation simply has as a “significant purpose” the gathering of 
intelligence on a suspected terrorist or terrorist supporter, what safeguards 
are in place to stop the investigators from turning over all of the 
information to a criminal prosecutor?  Moreover, what would prevent a 
prosecutor or, perhaps, an individual in the administration with a political 
motivation, from suggesting to a Special Agent in Charge of a field office 
that he should certify that a particular person is being targeted as part of an 
“authorized investigation” and use an NSL to obtain Internet or telephone 
records for that individual?  The potential for abuse of NSLs is certainly 
great, but the answer to the question of “reasonableness balancing” may 
turn on one’s view of which is more important: civil liberties or national 
security.  As more information about actual abuse of NSL power becomes 
public, however, perhaps the balance will shift towards stricter protections 
for privacy.
 
161
PART III. HOW TO DELIVER A SAFER NSL 
 
The previous section left open the question of whether NSLs could fit 
within an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  It 
does seem there are a sufficient number of arguments for fitting NSLs 
within a domestic regulatory scheme, if necessary, including: (1) NSLs are 
not “searches” and therefore need not satisfy the Fourth Amendment 
probable cause standard; (2) NSLs are foreign intelligence tools and 
accordingly do not require warrants unless they go beyond the standards set 
forth in 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1); (3) NSLs have a purpose beyond ordinary 
law enforcement and therefore satisfy the special-needs exception; or (4) 
NSLs are reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.  Regardless of 
how one classifies NSLs, there are steps that can be taken to safeguard civil 
liberties, while allowing the FBI to retain the power to issue NSLs.  There 
are several potential avenues for oversight of NSLs including intra-agency 
regulations, ex ante judicial monitoring, ex post judicial review, legislative 
oversight, and public advocacy.  
 
 159. CHURCH REPORT IIA, supra note 154, § 1. 
 160. Id. 
 161. But cf. David Kirkpatrick & Scott Shane, G.O.P. Senators Say Accord is Set on 
Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A1. 
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A. Administrative Checks 
One possible defense against abuse is the internal check on surveillance 
powers from within the law enforcement agency.162  First, the FBI Office 
of General Counsel issued a memo advising agents how to use NSLs 
correctly.163  This memo suggests that NSLs should be used “judiciously” 
because they are “powerful investigative tools.”164  Furthermore, the memo 
advises field offices to “establish[] and enforce[] an appropriate review and 
approval process for the use of NSL authorities.”165
In addition, each law enforcement and intelligence agency has an 
internal review board to investigate impropriety within the agency.
 
166  
Those internal review boards may provide a safeguard against abuse, 
because they work in the same agency as the investigators and would have 
the easiest access to the entire record without allowing classified 
information from leaving the office.  But is it wise to entrust the policing of 
investigations to the very same agencies that carry them out?  For instance, 
it is unknown whether internal oversight officers are given sufficient 
resources or have sufficient motivation to effectively monitor the 
investigators.167  While the agencies may be equipped to provide a first line 
of defense against abuse, perhaps oversight is better left to external 
“watchdogs.”168  Internal monitoring can also be problematic when the 
agency both defines the meanings of the terminology in the applicable 
statutes and then enforces the laws according to their own interpretations.  
For example, while the FBI Office of General Counsel’s memo on NSLs 
explains that they may be issued “during the course of a full international 
terrorism or foreign counterterrorism investigation,” but “cannot be used in 
criminal investigations unrelated to international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities,” it allows for NSLs to be issued in preliminary 
investigations where the nexus to counterterrorism has not yet been 
established.169
 
 162. Seth Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political 
Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 178 (2004). 
  If an investigation is authorized under FCIG its purpose is 
 163. See generally FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22. 
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Kreimer, supra note 162, at 178; see also Eric Lichtblau, Justice Department 
Investigators Find a Cover-Up in an F.B.I. Terror Case in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2005, at 37. 
 167. Kreimer, supra note 162, at 178. 
 168. Id. 
 169. FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22, at 2-3. To issue an NSL for a preliminary 
investigation, the investigation must be authorized by the Attorney General’s Guidelines for 
FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations 
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presumptively to “protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
activities.”170
B. Judicial Oversight 
  It is troubling that the very agency that is supposed to be 
limited by the “related to a foreign intelligence investigation” requirement 
is also charged with determining which investigations fall into that 
category.  Additionally, the fact that preliminary investigations are 
permitted to fall into this category means that practically any investigation, 
at least at the initial stage, may allegedly be connected to foreign 
intelligence and thus, allow access to almost any records that law 
enforcement wants to examine. 
Judicial oversight can be divided into two categories: ex ante judicial 
monitoring and ex post judicial review.171  As previously established, 
judicial approval is not required to issue an NSL.172  One obvious way to 
address the Fourth Amendment concerns regarding the reasonableness of 
NSLs would be to require prior judicial approval.  NSLs could be subject to 
a standard similar to that used to obtain Title III wiretaps.173  Some would 
surely argue that this requirement would be overly burdensome on both 
investigators and judicial resources.  Nevertheless, judicial approval has 
been required in many types of domestic investigations and has not proven 
unduly burdensome.  Alternatively, because NSLs are tools for foreign 
intelligence, they can be placed under the auspices of FISA and be subject 
to approval from the FISC before an NSL can be issued.  This would 
ensure that sensitive information relating to terrorism investigations would 
be handled carefully and cautiously.  The FISC can also ensure expedited 
processing that an ordinary court may not be able to provide.174
 
(“FCIG”).  Id. 
  
Furthermore, the long term and ongoing nature of a terrorism investigation 
makes it difficult to present specific facts to a judge to show probable 
cause; placing NSLs under the jurisdiction of the FISA court would both 
 170. Id. 
 171. Ex ante judicial oversight derives from a statutory requirement of court approval, 
such as a typical domestic criminal search warrant.  See LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 
supra note 42, at § 4.1.  Ex post judicial oversight refers to the eventual contestability of 
suspect searches or the fruits thereof by the parties searched.  See id. 
 172. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 
U.S.C. § 2511 (2002). 
 174. The FISC has eleven judges who specialize in national security matters.  50 U.S.C. § 
1803(a) (2006).  They work around the clock to process FISA requests.  Additionally, the 
FISC has a seventy-two-hour delay provision to allow emergency orders to be reviewed 
within seventy-two hours without requiring law enforcement to wait for the FISC to 
convene.  50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(4). 
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maintain the government’s ability to get NSLs authorized where needed, 
while providing an extra check on unfettered executive branch power. 
Ex post judicial review is another option to help safeguard privacy 
interests while still allowing the FBI to use NSLs for national security 
purposes.  NSLs could be redrafted to specifically inform their recipients of 
their right to go to court to challenge the reasonableness of the NSL.  Part 
of the government’s justification for the constitutionality of NSLs is that 
they are not searches, but merely information requests.  As a practical 
matter, however, very few recipients would feel such a request is 
“voluntary” when the FBI shows up with an NSL, asks the recipient to 
bring the requested records to the FBI’s office, and states that the recipient 
cannot tell anyone about the NSL.  Explicitly stating that NSLs are not 
court-ordered could eliminate concerns that NSLs are compulsory searches 
and as such must be approved by a court in order to be constitutional.  
Another option is to have ex post judicial monitoring structured in a 
manner comparable to the monitoring required for a Title III order.175
 
  This 
may in fact be less burdensome than Title III because investigators will not 
need prior approval and will follow a monitoring procedure that they are 
quite familiar with in the domestic criminal realm. 
C. Legislative Oversight 
Generally, when members of the public are concerned about a law, the 
official “answer” is that they should contact their congressman.  With 
regard to NSLs, the DOJ has asserted that Congress is actively involved in 
monitoring their use, and that the public should be assured that their elected 
representatives are looking out for their privacy interests.176
 
 175. Title III wiretaps require reporting to the magistrate who authorized them.  See 18 
U.S.C. §§ 25
  This 
reasoning fails to take into account several key points.  First, in a 
representative democracy, elected officials are heavily influenced by public 
opinion.  It is hard to rely on Congress to protect our privacy rights if 
members of the public are unaware that NSLs are being issued and 
therefore are not actively involved in seeking congressional intervention on 
their behalf.  Second, the DOJ explanation ignores the partisan politics 
prevalent in the congressional oversight process.  For example, the chair of 
the Judiciary or the Intelligence committees in either house of Congress 
18-19.  Not only does Title III require prior judicial approval, it includes 
procedures to safeguard the rights of the individuals whose communications are intercepted.  
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. 
 176. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Questions About the USA PATRIOT Act, 
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
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could issue a Congressional subpoena to compel more complete disclosure 
from the FBI on the use of NSLs.  Of course, “the minority has no power to 
compel, and . . . Republicans are not going to push for oversight of the 
Republicans.”177
Effective legislative oversight requires both the cooperation of the DOJ, 
with regard to accurate reporting of the use of NSLs, as well as the ability 
of recipients to inform their representative that an NSL was issued.  
Congressional oversight, while potentially valuable, is too dependent on 
information obtained from the DOJ for its effectiveness.
 
178
D. Non-governmental Advocacy Groups 
  Those who 
support the continued use of NSLs do not want to doubt the accuracy of the 
DOJ’s numbers, but self-reported numbers may have a greater potential for 
misrepresentation without external verification.  The gag order provision of 
section 2709(c) would prevent a constituent from disclosing the issuance of 
an NSL; without the efforts of external groups, possible governmental 
abuses of NSL power may not be brought to the public’s attention. 
While it is possible for the legislature and the courts to provide checks 
on executive power and still maintain the secrecy of investigations,179 
perhaps the most effective oversight comes from non-governmental civil 
liberties groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”).  These groups can 
initiate lawsuits to obtain records and documents to track the use of 
NSLs.180  In 2004, internal FBI reviews identified 113 violations of federal 
law or bureau policy—again, presumably involving the use of NSLs—most 
of which related to intelligence or national security investigations.181  
While “watchdog” groups are important sources of information for the 
public,182 there is a tendency to exaggerate the threat that NSLs actually 
present.  Such slanted presentation may result in public resentment and 
may ultimately undermine the valuable service that such groups provide.183
 
 177. Gellman, supra note 1, at A1 (quoting Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.), a House Judiciary 
Committee member). 
 
 178. See Dahlia Lithwick & Julia Turner, A Guide To the PATRIOT Act, Part 1: Should 
You Be Scared of the PATRIOT Act?, SLATE, Sept. 8, 2003, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2087984/ (describing how FOIA requests have been incomplete 
and Congressional requests have been ignored or classified). 
 179. Kreimer, supra note 162, at 178. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Eric Lichtblau, Tighter Oversight of F.B.I. Is Urged After Investigation Lapses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at A16. 
 182. FOIA requests have allowed public access to DOJ documents. 
 183. See Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Mocks Librarians and Others Who Oppose Parts of 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding concerns over the lack of safeguards and intrusions into 
privacy, NSLs have existed for nearly twenty years and are likely to 
continue to be used.  Effective oversight is essential to making NSLs an 
acceptable tool for law enforcement.  While the Department of Justice has 
not given specific information on how NSLs are used and whether or not 
they have proved to be useful, there is great value in giving law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools they need to do their jobs 
to keep our country safe.184  But as Benjamin Franklin observed over 200 
years ago, “they that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little 
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”185  The Framers of our 
Constitution were wary of the potential for abuse in giving the executive 
the power to search a man’s home or seize his property without requiring 
the specification of the reason for the search and what the search was 
expected to uncover to a neutral party.186  Furthermore, they believed that 
power in the hands of one branch of government, without meaningful and 
thorough oversight by the other branches, would lead to overreaching and 
infringement upon individual civil liberties.187  Following 9/11, however, 
the political climate in the United States, perhaps understandably, became 
less protective of civil liberties and more interested in safeguarding our 
borders and our cities.188  In fact, a recent poll suggests that this attitude 
continues five years later and that Americans have expressed a willingness 
to tolerate invasions of privacy without warrants in order to fight terrorism, 
despite being wary of the impact these types of actions might have on civil 
liberties.189  Unfortunately, in light of recent revelations about the 
executive branch’s use of illegal—or at the very least, questionably legal—
wiretaps to spy on U.S. citizens,190
 
Counterterrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A23. 
 the changes made to many existing laws 
under the PATRIOT Act may continue to take this country further away 
from the vigorous protections intended by the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights. 
 184. See generally Doe v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 185. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 348 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., 1980). 
 186. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 187. Krent, supra note 47, at 94-95. 
 188. Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 471. 
 189. Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, New Poll Finds Mixed Support for Wiretaps, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at A1. 
 190. See Transcript, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on Wartime 
Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority, WASH. POST., Feb. 6, 2006 (online 
edition), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020600931.html. 
